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_1_s document constitutes one vo.l,_meof the f_nal report prepared under
Contract NAsg.-.9046,_S_afef_ Sty, which was conducted by
the Aerospace Syst_]ns Division, Aerospace Group, The Boeing Company_ under
the d'treetion of the Advanced Projects Office, Advanced Missions Program
Off_ce, Manned Spacecraft Center, NA,qA. .Theobjective of the study was
to develop a mona_eme_nt too] for evaluatln_ conceptual designs of 9uture
manned space systems from a safety vlewpo_nt. This objective was achieved
through the app3.ieation of method_.es.ltechniques, which are described
where necessary ._nappropriate vo31_mes of this final report, for ans/iyzing
space station safety problems. _b_s work resulted in the development of
Crew Safety Guidelines wh.leh can be used :In evaluating future space
station concepts.
In Phase I of the study_ the work was d._rected toward a broad class of
space stations, using several spec_f.ln configurations as examples, and
considering both crew safety s_.dmission accomplishment as safety goals o
In M_y 1969_ the study was redirected by NASA into Phase II to provide
more direct support to the NASA Phase B Future Space Station Study,
considering only crew safety as the safety goal. To the extent possible,
the work done in Phase I was revised and adapted to Phase II and all
I documents of this final report, except as otherwise noted, include theres lts fr m both phases. In both phase the study scope included only
on-orbit operations and not launch, boost, de-orbit_ and recovery opera-
tlonsj or amy operations of the logistics support system, except for
close-in rendezvous and docking operations.
The approach taken in the study was to examine the space station from the
viewpoint of safety only, with the intent of identifying as complete a
list as possible of those measures which should be taken to maximize crew
safety. Also, and especially in Phase II, the study dealt primarily with
station concepts 3 rather than specific designs or hardware items. It was
not possible, and no attempt was made, to examine the impact of safety
measures on other important aspects of space station development, such as
cost, design difficulty, or operaticmm_ suitability. As station develop-
ment proceeds, trade studies between safety measures and other factors will
be r..quired and management decisions must be made as to the extent to which
other desirable features will be pe_tted to override safety measures.
The documents constituting the final study report are:
• D2-113070-4, Dondensed Summar_ Report
• Ee-ll3070-5, Crew Safetz Gulde]tues. Volumes I and II
Ill
• D2-_13070-6, Supportlz_ .An_iFses
• Analysis. of Operations
• Experiment Program
• Traffic Patterns Analysis
• Human Requirements
• Meteoroid Penetration
• D2-I13070-93 Logic Diagram
• D2-I13070-IO, Fault Tree Analysis
e...._D_LL_7(I-_LL,-_ubo..yztem s Analysis
Other documents produced _iring the study but not part of the final
report are:
• D2-113070-1, Detail Study Plan (Phase I only)
• D2-I13070-2_ Midterm Oral Re_ort I
• D2-113070-3, Final Oral Report
• _2-113070-7, Baseline Mission Descri_tlon (Phase I only)
• D2-1-1_O70_$, Baseline System Description (Phase I only)
The references applicable to this document are shown in Section 6.0.
However, all the references for those documents which comprise the final
study report are compiled in D2-113070-5.
. . _j:_-_i_._
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ABSTRACT
A number of functions in an Earth-orbitlng space station concept were
investigated for safety implications by the fault tree amalysis technique.
Certain major undesired events, selected from a logic analysis of the
space syztem concept (see E_-113070-9) , were subjected to the fault tree
analysis to identify safety guidelines at a level of detail commensurate
with study objectives. These analyses provide a rationally developed
and orderly foundation for generating the safety guidelines, and display
the relationships of potential undesired events to the basic functions
that ar_ characteristic of space system operations. This document con-
tains a description of the fault tree zechnique, a complete file of the
trees which were developed during th_ course of the Safety Study, and an
index to the guidelines which were derLved from the analysis. The guide-
].ines themselves are compiled in Document D2-113070-§.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
1.1
The systems safety fault tree analysis provides a graphic representation
of Boolean relationships between discrete normal and adverse situations
whlch_ taken singly or in combination, could result in the development of
, a specific undesired event. _iring conceptual evolution of a system, the
fault tree technique can be used effectively to identify causes of un-
desired events, leading to the generation of safety guidelines by which
the impact of such undesired events could be reduced or prevented.
1o2
This document contains the three specific fault trees developed during the
Space Station Safety Study, explanations of the symbols, terminology and
methods which were used, and references to the safety guidelines which
were derived from the identification of numerous events. The safety
guidelines themselves are presented in Document D2-113070-5. Other poten-
tial candidates for fault tree analysls are mentioned in Paragraphs 2.1.3
and 2.1.4, which could be considered for development during subsequent or
follow-on studies.
:( 1.3
Although the orbiting space station received primary attention, most
safety aspects of the space base also are included _nce the fault tree
analysis was general enough to be equally applicable to either configura-
tion. The top level undesired events analyzed by this technique are
extensions of certain proposition statements in the logic analysis docu-
ment, D2-113070-9, which are repeated at the beginning of the respective
fault trees°
(
-1 -
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2.0 FAULT T_F_E RATIONALE
2.1 FAULT TREE ANALYSIS METHOD
2.1.1
A fault tree is a model of the various parallel and sequential combina-
tions of eo_onent states that can cause, or result in, the occurrence of
a specified _ state (an "undesired event"). A fault tree analysis is
the process by which the fault tree model is generated. It is a deductive
tecb/lique whleh can be applied to the investigation of either gross or
detailed systems. The depth to which the fault tree ea_ be evolved is
restricted only by the level of detail available. The fault tree analysis
performed during this study was carried to a level of detail that was
felt to be consistent with the space st_51on _.oncepts embodied in Beference
No. 92. Thus, confined to this detail, the analytical effort resulted in
a gross, top-level fault tree carried down only to m_Jor components or
functions. A top-level fault tree of this type can make a significant
contribution to the primary objective of a preliminary hazard analysis in
producing crew safety guidelines related to the selected undesired events.
This approach also lends itself to a secondary objective, that of further
development with minimum or no modification should the analysis effort
be continued later _hcn additional system detail is available.
/
2.1.2
The methods and techniques of conducting a fault tree analysis generally
are well known and have been described at length in other documentation;
however, in brief, the analysis is conducted in the following manner:
Ste_ 1. State the umdeslred event.
Step 2. Subdivide the problem by system elements, classes of causes,
mission phases, etc.
Step 3. State all the immediate, necessary events which will cause
each undesired event of Step 2 to occur.
. Step 4. Continue as in Step 3, until the most basic identifiable
causal events have been established.
This process results in a progressively downward expanding "tree" of
events, whose relationships are shown by certain symbols and interconnect-
ing lines° The symbols and their usage are described in Section B.O.
2.1.3
In addition to continued development of the present work, the scope of this
analysis may also be expanded by developing further undesired events identi-fied within the logic analysis. Examples could include such events as:
-3-
D2-I13070-IO
_t
b
"Crew mcrabf.r,:arc endangf_red due to rate of _:,j,pl_of breathable
j , ---Referenceoxyl,en dcerea:_inl_below rate necessary to su;_;l.ainlife "
D2'-.I_lROTO-9; pr,,l,_..ition .LtK,
"Cr :w member:: art, <ndanMored by exposure to hazardou_ chemicals."_-
Reference D2-11_,O'I'O-9_proposition 32B.
"Crew member:: are endangered due to deprivation of food or water."---
Re:['rrene,'D2-i13070-9; proposition 41C.
"Crew member:_ are endangered due to collision with parent ,_pacee_a_1.,
and loL;i',:tie:_v,.hicle."---Reference D2-I].3070-9; proposition 63B.
11. _;h<,IfLdbe n,fi:.,.dt}-_t the:foregoing are not vnrbai,im q11otation_',ir m i;h_:
original pr,_,pof_ltion:;_ but rather have beo.n paraphra_'_r.d to plao(_ thc.m Ln
the fau].t "tr_,econtext o1? mlde_ired eventn.
2.1.4
Areau _,['ful:,uremml.y_l:_ may al_:_obe identiflnd by J.nduct:Lveor iDbuit].vn
m,:a:a:_, _Id r,lated direc'tly to an undesired event of a .",pcciflepo_,el_tial,
accident_ hazardou_ condition, or subsystem/hardwar,_ laiLure. Exa_aple',
of these events could include:
"Inadvertent i_lition of propulsion module engine."
"Crew endangered hy radiation release from nuclear power generator."
"Crew endangered by failure of Environmental Control and Life Support
System."
"Cabin atmospheric thermal circuit fails."
2.2 FAULT TREE AND LOGIC DIAGRAM PKRASEOLOGY
2.2.1
Fault tree statements are phrased differently from those appearing in the
logic diagram. The logic diagram statements used in this study generally
reflect a favorable situation or the accomplishment of a successful
activity; e.g. _ "There will be no immediate danger of directly fatal
exposure of any crew member to heat." Fault tree statements_ on the other
hand_ assume an tmsuccessful missicn or hazardous condition: "Crew members
will be injured through exposure to potentially fatal heat (or cold)."
Thus_ a fault tree statement will be in most cases the negative or inverse
of a corresponding logic diagram statement. While reasoning processes are
the same in either case_ the statement of an _mdesired event as an element
in a troublesome situation permits direct identification of a fault or a
hazardous condition contrfbuting to that event. Pecause fault tree state-
ments frequently are given only in topical or key-word form_ however, the ""
-4-
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reader is cautioned to examine carefully the total context within which
these statements are made_ to avoid possible eonflmion s erroneous conclu-
sions or misunderstanding of the analystts intent.
2.2.2
Failure of an item i_ te_ed "primary" when it fails while functioning
within its normal operating mode_ or "secondary" when failure is due to
f_metioning outside specified tolera_ee limits or is the result of an
,:,xtr_meousinfluence. Where the words "command function" or their equiva-
Lent appear in the description of a_1undesired event I they indicate that
a f_ilure in the item or function being analyzed occurs as a consequence
,,fan action (or non-action) taking place in some other system or compo-
n(_nt which dic,tatoI_ ("commands") the manner in which the item i_unetlons.
_. _ END-POINT CODES
E,,.,:h evr'nt denoted by a (,:[rele (3.4) or a diamond (3.,5) is the lowest
l.(_velof development for that branch of the fault tree. Aecordlngly_ the
,,wurl.hm_ been a_m:I._ed one of the following five codes to indicate its
',:i,al;u'.',in the analyv,:L_,as of the time the study effort was terminated.
g(wc_:r_LLof the event._ as,qig_ed Code I appear to warrant considerable
further inveotigationp if sa_dwhen the opportunity should arise during
mfl_v,equent programs. See Section 4.0 for a detailed discussion on many
(i of the end-points that were identified.
Code
I. An event in which insufficient data or time exists within the scope
of this study for effective further development .........................
II. Continued analysis of this event would be redundant; development of
a similar event exists elsewhere. This code carries an additional
identifier in parentheses which locates by chart number and event
designator where a similar event has been developed in the a,_alysis.
In the following example, expansion of an event similar to Event "E"
is accomplished on Chart 1.8 under Event "B""
(
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liI. _e effect of the end-point is deemed insignificant and further
development is not warranted.
IV. Basic or inherent fault; no further development possible. (Primary
failure. )
V. A fault event assumed to occ1_ for the development of the fault
path. It also may be a naturally hazardous state of the system.
i
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3.0 FAULT TREE SYMBOLS
3.1 RECTANGLE
A rectangle indicates an event. It is
INJURY RESULTS always used in combination with one or
FROM FAILURE another of the following symbols, which
TO CONTROLFIRE is placed immediately below and adjacent
to it. The event is Identigled by a
letter in the top portion of the symbol.
If the event is repeated on another chart,
or_isewhere on the same chart, the chart
number and the other identifier are given
in the ].ower portion of the symbol. In
some cases the event may be re-stated,
when transferred to a new chart, for th(_
sake of clarity and completenes_.
3.2 "OR" GATE
0UtOUt The "OR" gate indicates a situation
wherein the output event will exist if one
or more of the input events exist. The
analogy of an electric circuit, shown in
Figure 3-i, aptly illustrates the "OR"
--- gate concept.
2 or more Inputs
I LI.GHTC I
OFF
"
#
FIGURE 3-i: EXAMPLE OF "OR" GATE
-7-
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Output The "AND" gate indicates a logical opera-
tion in which the co-existence of all
input events i_; required to produce the
output eventj as illustrated by the
electric circull in Figure 3-2.
2 or more Inputs
f
A LIGHT C
_ B
I SWA
OPEN
FIGURE 3-2: EXAMPLE OF "AND" GATE
3•4 CIRCLE
O The circle indicates an elemental end
event which is not amenable to further
development.
3.5 DIAMOND
The diamond indicates an event that is the
lowest level to which that particular
branch of the fault tree has been developed
in this study. The possible causes of the
event have not been analyzed further either
because the event was not considered to
warrant further study, the necessary infor-
mation for further study was t,navailable,
or study limitations did not permit d.
-8-
D2-I13070-IO
continued evaluation. (See Section 4.0.)
Each event denoted by a diamond is coded
by a roman nluneral Just below the box to
indicate its status in the analysis. The
code is explained in Section 2.0.
3.6 TRIANGLE
l
The triangle indicates that an expansion
A of the event appears elsewhere. The
location of the expansion, that is, the
chart number and letter designator of the
event, is indicated in the base of the
triangle.
_.7 CORRELATION SYMBOL
The top undesired events analyzed in thi:;
THEREWILL BE NO IM- document are derivations of propositions
MEDIATE DANGER OF originating in D2-i13070-9, Logic Diagram.
( DIRECTLY FATAL EXPO- For the purposes of this study, an arrow
SURE OF ANY CREW symbol as shown here is used to correlate
MEMBER TO DECOMPRES- the initial fault tree statement to an
SION associated statement in the logic analysis.
The exact statement in the logic diagram
(16C; D2- h_s been repeated in this document in the
113070-9) first box of each fault tree. Reference
is made to the source outside the lower
_#7 right-hand corner. (In the illustration#
v the reference is to proposition "C" of
CREW MEMBERS WILL BE Chart 16 in Document D2-I13070-9o) The
IN IMMEDIATEDANGER undesired event which is to be analyzed by
OF DIRECTLYFATALEX- fatult tree tec_ique is stated in the box
" POSURETO DECOMPRES- beneath the arrow, and the fault tree is
SION developed below that.
(
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4.0 GUIDELINE/EVENT RELATIONSHIPS
4.1 GENERAL
The following tabulatl.on i?1_ovidesa cross-index of the guidelines in
1,,cument D2-I13070-5 wh'._chare related to or reference events given in
the fault trees. Since the fault trees deal primarily with decompression 3
hnat and radiation_ man d guidelines in that document are not listed here.
A n_nbel, of guidelines enccmpass more than one event, and frequently_ more
than one guideline wax derived from or pertained to an event. In the
interest of brevity and to avoid redm_dancy_ event descriptions have been
omitted from this list; these may be determined from the appropriate fault
tree in Section 5.0 of this document.
- ll -
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_.c_ CROSS-INDEX OF FAULT 'I_EE EVENTS TO GUIDELINES
(}_J[dcllne
Ew:_nt Nc_. Guide].ino Title
I.I-A 3.18 Rapid Decompression Effect_
i.I-C 12.13 Compartmenta tion
, [.]-D 8.1] Oxygen Leak Isolation
.9.L2 Oxygen Quantity and Usage
8.14 Ozygen Ztorag_ Tanks Redundancy
13.15 Oxygen Usage Manual Control
' [-E _ 4 Hatch Automatic Closure, 0 ,) e
8.9 ];n',ironmentgl Control/Lifo S,_pport Systems (EC/LSS)
R_du_id.aney
8.30 Warning System--Oxygen Pressure
[.I-F 8.16 PLSS Emergency Backup
8.24 Suit Loop Checkout
8.25 Suit Loop Components Maintenance
8.26 Suit Loop Component Redundancy
8.27 Suit Loop Manual Control
8.28 Suit Loop Outlets
8.29 Suit Loop Pressure Monitor
I.I-G 5.11 P]v,ssure Suit Repair
8.2!I Suil Loop Checkout
12.48 Monitoring of EVA/IVA
I.I-H 3.5 Hatch Closure
].._-I [2.18 Crew Distribution
l.l-J 3.2 Crack Propagation in Primary st_ctLme
3.17 Primary Structure Inspection and Repair
3.19 Spacecraft Structural Strength
8.17 Pressur_ Leak Detectors
I.I-L 3.10 Leakage Repair System
i .I-M
1.2-B 8.21 Pressure Suit/PLSS Oxygen Usage
1.2-C 5.8 Injury or Damage from Spacecraft Equipment
]..2'-G 5.7 Ext,_,riorEquipment Design and Location
5.8 Inj_% _ or Damage from Spacecraft Equipment
- 12 -
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Gu Idel ine
Ever,t No. Guideline Title
I.3-C 5.2 Crew Restrictions During Docking
1.3-F 2.2 Flight Path Orbit Seloction
[.3-_', 6.10 Propellant Tank Protection
, [.3-M -_.i Compartment Integrity
I..3-N 3.7 Hatch Pressure Loading
1.3-O 3,(i Hatch Positive Closure
1.3-P 3.8 Hatch Seal Leakage Rate
L.4-B 6.11 Protection of Pressure Vessels
1.4-C 8.5 Continuous Control of Cabin Pressure
8.13 Oxygen Regulation Component Redundancy
8.18 Pressure Relief Valve Repair Procedures
_- 1,4-F 3.20 Vented Component Replacement
!t 3.23 Venting Provisions
]..4-G 3.15 Pressurizable Volume Relief Protection
1.4-M 6.8 Pressure System Safing
1.5-B 3.25 Warning Systems, Fail-Safe
1.5-C 3.11 Medical Equipment for Emergencies
8.7 Emergency Life Support Provisions
8.8 Emergency Pre.3surization Oxygen Supply
1.5-E 3.3 Equipment Design for Rapid Decompression
1.6-E 3.5 Hatch C?osure
1.6-F 12.28 Emergency Procedures and Training
i.7-G 12.9 Cargo Transfer Equipment Redundancy
1.7-K 5.3 Docking Closure Rate Control
5.4 Docking Light Redundancy
5.5 Docking Port Redundancy
6.10 Propellant Tank Protection
I 1.7-L 5.1 Bulk Cargo Restraint
- 13 -
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Guideline
Event No. Guideline Title
1.7-M 12.35 Hazardous Resupply Operations Monitoring
1.8-H 12.13 Compartmentatlon
1.9-K 3.5 Hatch Closure
1.12-D 6.7 Pressure Systems Location
1.12-F 6.6 Pressure System Dynamics
1.12-J 6.5 Pressure Subsystem Interconnection
2.I-B , i0.6 Electrical Power System Location
2.1-G 10.20 Personnel Protection from Heated Surfaces
2.1-I 10.25 Spacecraft Thermal Protection
2.2-C lO.12 Heat Monitoring in Operating Equipment
2.2-J i0.17 Lubri cant s
2.3-D i0.5 Electrical Power Source Cooling
2.3-J i0.14 Ignition Source Control
2.3-L 12.37 Incoming Vehicle Emergency
2.3-N 1.24 Warning System--Contaminants Detection and Alarm
6.3 Flammable/Exploslve Material Exterior to Spacecraft
6.4 Hazardous Mixtures
2.4-D i0.4 Cryogenic s
2.5-B lO.11 Heating Element Flame Suppression
2.5-D 4.14 Routing of Power Distribution Lines
lO. 19 Overcurrent Protection
2.6-D lO.13 Hypergolic and Pyrophoric Material
lO.21 Propellant Supply System Location
2.6-F lO.21 Propellant Supply System Location
2.6-G 10.2 Combustible Waste Materials
10.21 Propellant Supply System Location
- 14 -
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Guideline
Event No. Guideline Title
2.0-H ].0.15 Isolation of Oxygen Source
_..o
2.6-I 10.20 Personnel Protection from Heated Surfaces
-7-B 10.7 Fire Control
i0.23 Self-Propagation of Fires
;_.7-F 12.29 Emergency Procedures (Fire)
2.7-H 12.6 As_istance to Injured Personnel
2.7-1 12.28 Emergency Procedures and Training
2.7-M 6.7 Pressure Systems Location
2.7-N 12.29 Emergency Procedures (Fire)
2.7-P
2.7-R 6.4 Hazardous Mixtures
r_
_.7-U 6.12 Shrouding and Shielding cf Pressure Lines3 Water Electrolysis Unit Cell Reve sed Polarity
2.8-G 10.22 Protection of Temperature Critical Equipment
2.9-B 10.7 Fire Control
10.27 Thermal Control Temperature Sensors
2.9-C 12.33 Fire Alarm
2.9-E 10.2 Combustible Waste Materials
2.10-D i.i Airflow Cutoff to Enclosed Contamination Sources
12.33 Fire Alarm
2.11-E 4.4 Electrical Connections
6.2 Explosion-proof Electrical Equipment
2.11-F 4.7 Grounding of Spacecraft and Equipment
2 .ll-G
2.11-H 6.1 Electrical Ignition
2.12-C _.3 Electrical Arcing
2.12-D 4.5 Electrical Cable Shorts
5.9 Mechanical Shielding of Electrical Equipment
- 15 -
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Guideline
Event No. Guideline Title
b
2.12-E 4.1 Cable Insulation Damage
5.9 Mechanical Shielding of Electrical Equipment
2.12-J 2.1 Component Design for Meteoroid Impact Protection
2.12-N 4.6 Electrical Connector Checks
2.12-0 5.9 Mechanical Shielding of Electrical Equipment
2.12-P 4.2 Connector Mismating
4.12 Protective Covers for Electrical Equipment
5.9 Mechanical Shielding of Electrical Equipment
2.12-Q 4.2 Connector Mismatlng
2.15-D lO.17 Lubricants
2.15-E 12.42 Intercom System
2.15-G 10.5 Electrical Power Source Cooling
2.15-H 12.42 Intercom System
2.15-J 1.15 Hazardous Materlals--Quantltles
2.15-K 10.9 Fire Retardant Electrical Equipment
2.17-C 1.5 Control Procedures for Excessive Contamination
1.15 Hazardous Materials--Quantities
2.19-E 10.3 Containment of Fire
10.8 Fire-Resistant Electrical Insulation
12.6 Assistance to Injured Personnel
2.19-F 10.2 Combustible Waste Materials
2.19-I lO.16 Location of Combustibles
3.I-B 9.14 Radiation Exposure and Control Program
9.15 Radiation Exposure Limit
3.1-C 9.4 Microwave and X-Radiation Hazard
3.1-I 9.2 Disposal of Radioactive Material
3.1-M 9.5 Nuclear Power Radiation Protection
9.9 Placement of Equipment and Stores i.
9.20 Spacecraft Radiatiou Shielding ./
!
- 16 -
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Guideline
Event No. Guideline Title
q.2-H 9.16 Radiation Haven
3.3-E 9.8 Orbital Path Radiation Environment
3.3-][ 9.1 Controlled Access and Use of Radiation £ourees
9.3 Handling and Use of Radioactive Material
3.3-J 9.10 Protection Against Nuclear Explosion Radiation
3.3-K 9.5 Nuclear Power Radiation Protection
9.6 Nuclear Power Unit Radiation Protection
9.7 Nuclear Reactor S_fety
3.4-D 9.17 Radiation Monitoring
3.4-G 9.15 Radiation Exposure Record
3.4-0 9.11 Radiation Detectors Location and Characteristics
3.4-P
3.5-C 9.18 Radiation Protection DurlngEVAJ
\
3.5-F 9.13 Radiation Environment Restrictions on EVA
3.5-H 9.5 Nuclear Power Radiation Protection
3.5-K 9.21 Selection of Materials for Use in Radiation
3.5-P Environment
3.7-D 9.19 Radioactive Stores
- 17 -
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5.o FAULT TREES
._._i FT-I, EVENTS RELATED TO DECOMPRESSION
Top event_ of the twelve charts comprising this fault tree are listed
below. Numbers in parentheses refer to the predecessor charts in whlch
the events originated.
Chart No. Top Event Page No.
1.1 Crew members will be in immediate danger of directly
fatal exposure to decompression.
1.2 Decompression results from failure of pressure suit
pressure retention (1.1).
1.j_ Failure of pressure retention results from failure of
structural matrix (1.1).
1.4 Failure of pressure retention results from subsystem
failure (1.1).
(i 1.5 Crew exposed to decompression, and protective _otio_
not accomplished through use of emergercy e_ipment
(i.i).
1.6 Crew exposed and protective action _t ac_-mpli_hed
through emergency procedures (lol).
1.7 Structural matrix failure results from g_ag_ furling
space operations (1.3).
1.8 Decompression rate exceeds procedure response time
(l.6).
1.9 Intracompartment eJnergency action is delayed (1.8)o
1.10 Compartment hatch failure hinders escape action
(hardware failure) (1.8).
1.11 Compartment hatch design hinders escape action (1.8).
1.12 Spacecraft liquid system fails explosively (1.4).
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